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A COMPOSITIONAL COALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS FOR
STRATEGIC GAMES
ACHIM BLUMENSATH AND VIKTOR WINSCHEL
Abstract. We provide a compositional coalgebraic semantics for strategic
games. In our framework, like in the semantics of functional programming
languages, coalgebras represent the observable behaviour of systems derived
from the behaviour of the parts over an unobservable state space. We use coal-
gebras to describe and program stage games, finitely and potentially infinitely
repeated hierarchical or parallel games with imperfect and incomplete infor-
mation based on deterministic, non-deterministic or probabilistic decisions of
learning agents in possibly endogenous networks. Our framework is compo-
sitional in that arbitrarily complex network of games can be composed. The
coalgebraic approach allows to represent self-referential or reflexive structures
like institutional dynamics, strategic network formation from within the net-
work, belief formation, learning agents or other self-referential phenomena that
characterise complex social systems of cognitive agents. And finally our games
represent directly runnable code in functional programming languages that
can also be analysed by sophisticated verification and logical tools of software
engineering.
WE THANK DAVID COLANDER, SAMSON ABRAMSKY, ALEXANDER KURZ,
DUSKO PAVLOVIC, PAULO OLIVA AND JULES HEDGES FOR DISCUSSIONS AS
WELL AS THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE GAMES FOR LOGIC AND PROGRAM-
MING LANGUAGES VIII WORKSHOP 2013 IN LONDON, THE 19TH INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTING IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE IN VAN-
COUVER 2013 AND THE DAGSTUHL SEMINAR COALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS OF
REFLEXIVE ECONOMICS, 2015.
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21. Introduction
We provide a coalgebraic semantic for strategic games based on categorical meth-
ods [15, 1, 21, 9]. The first formulation of games in terms of coalgebraic semantics
appeared in [19], later work comprise [8, 13, 3]. In addition to these approaches we
provide operations in order to compose arbitrarily complicated games from more
basic ones. We allow the players to decide based on deterministic, non-deterministic
or probabilistic algorithms given their epistemic state that arises from observations,
i.e. we feature econometric or learning agents.
The coalgebraic approach to semantics has evolved for programming languages
that are modelled as abstract unobservable state transition systems [22, 20, 21, 9].
Being build on this mathematical framework our games are directly implementable
for example in Haskell. The key idea that we want to exploit in this paper is an
analogy to bialgebraic theories [10] covering the behaviour of programming lan-
guages. The first usage of bialgebras for a semantic of cellular automatons for
multi-agent systems was developed in [24]. We extend these ideas to game theory
with the operations in the cellular automatons being players and the cellular grid
being a network of players. The semantics of cellular automatons is here then a
semantics of the overall game played by the coalgebraic players.
The coalgebraic constructions allow not only for infinite horizons or repetitions
of games but also for infinite reflexive structures like beliefs of beliefs and so on
that arise in economic game theory as Harsanyi type spaces [4, 5, 6, 16, 7]. This
structure has been formulated coalgebraically in computer science [18, 17]. Reflexive
structures may also arise as games within networks that are played over the very
structure of the network itself. Reflexivity naturally arise in systems of cognitive
agent who reason about the system they are part of, see for a socialogical account
thereof in [14]. The resulting mathematical paradoxes are discussed in [12, 25, 2].
Finally, the coalgebraic approach interfaces to the program verification tools
or specification languages like modal logics [11] that can be used to analyse the
strategic games in our framework.
2. Framework
In order to keep the category theoretical overhead to a minimum, we will intro-
duce all category theoretical notions only in the special case of the category of sets
where the objects are sets and the arrows are total functions. Other examples of
categories contain sets and relations, measurable spaces and measurable functions,
or topological spaces and continuous functions.
The main concepts we will need are those of a category, functor and natural
transformation.
Definition 2.1. A category C consists of a class Cobj of objects, a class Carr of
arrows, and a composition operation ◦ on arrows. Each arrow f ∈ Carr has a
domain X ∈ Cobj and a codomain Y ∈ Cobj. We write f : X → Y to indicate
that f is an arrow with domain X and codomain Y . The composition operation is
assumed to satisfy the following two conditions:
(1) The composition f ◦ g of two arrows is defined if, and only if, the domain
of f is equal to the codomain of g.
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(2) The composition operation is associative, i.e., for all arrows f : X → Y ,
g : Y → Z, h : Z →W ,
(h ◦ g) ◦ f = h ◦ (g ◦ f) .
(3) For each object X, there is an identity arrow idX : X → X such that
f ◦ idX = f and idX ◦ g = g ,
for all arrows f : X → Y and g : Z → X.
Definition 2.2. A functor F (from the category of sets to itself) is an operation
assigning
• to each set X a new set F(X) and
• to each function g : X → Y a function F(g) : F(X)→ F(Y )
such that
F(idX) = idF(X) and F(f ◦ g) = F(f) ◦ F(g) ,
for all sets X and all functions f : Y → Z and g : X → Y .
X
Y Z
F(X)
F(Y ) F(Z)
g
f ◦ g
f
F(g)
F(f ◦ g)
F(f)
As an example, let us introduce three functors that will be used below.
(1) The identity functor id maps every set X and every function f : X → Y
to itself.
(2) The finite power-set functor Pfin maps every set X to the set Pfin(X) of its
finite subsets, and it maps a function f : X → Y to the function
Pfin(f) : Pfin(X)→ Pfin(Y ) : S 7→ { f(s) | s ∈ S } .
(3) The finite probability functor Dfin maps a set X to the set of all finite
probability distributions on X, i.e., all maps d : X → [0, 1] such that only
finitely many elements of X are mapped to non-zero values. For a function
f : X → Y , it returns the function
Dfin(f) : Dfin(X)→ Dfin(Y ) : d 7→ df ,
where
df (y) :=
∑
x∈f−1(y)
d(x) .
Beside the notion of a functor, we also need those of a natural transformation
and a distributive law.
Definition 2.3. (a) A natural transformation η : F ⇒ G from a functor F to a
functor G is a family η = (ηX)X of functions
ηX : F(X)→ G(X) ,
indexed by sets X, satisfying
ηY ◦ F(f) = G(f) ◦ ηX , for every function f : X → Y .
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X
Y
F(X)
F(Y )
G(X)
G(Y )
f F(f) G(f)
ηX
ηY
(b) A distributive law between two functors F and G is a natural transformation
η : F ◦G⇒ G ◦ F.
Examples of natural transformations will appear in Section 2.2 below.
2.1. Processes. Before introducing games, let us define the simpler notion of a
process, which corresponds to a game with a single player. Processes will provide
the technical machinery our framework is based on.
A process is a state based system transforming an input sequence into an output
sequence. In each step it receives an input value and, depending on its current
state, it produces an output value and changes its state. Alternatively, a process
can decide to terminate. Formally, a process is given by
• a set S of states,
• a set I of inputs,
• a set O of outputs,
• a set R of results, and
• a function pi : S × I → C(R+ S ×O), for some functor C.
The function pi describes one step of the process. When in state s ∈ S and given
the input i ∈ I, the process chooses a possible continuation that consists in either
terminating with a result r ∈ R, or in continuing in a state s′ ∈ S and producing
an output value c ∈ O.
In the above definition, the choice functor C determines which kind of process
we are dealing with. Important examples for choice functors are the following ones.
(1) The deterministic choice functor Cdet = id is the identity functor. It can
be used if the input uniquely determines what happens next.
(2) The non-deterministic choice functor Cndet = Pfin is the finite power-set
functor. It can be used if, for a given input, there might be several possible
continuations of the process.
(3) The probabilistic choice functor Cprob = Dfin is the finite probability func-
tor. It can be used if the continuation of the process is random.
To apply the category theoretical machinery it will be convenient to write the
function pi in the form
pi : S → (C(R+ S ×O))I .
In category theoretical terms, such functions can be seen as so-called coalgebras.
Definition 2.4. Let F be a functor. An F-coalgebra is a function h : X → F(X),
for some set X.
Hence, a process pi becomes a Π0-coalgebra pi : S → Π0(S), where Π0 is the
process functor
Π0(X) := C(R+X ×O)I .
We denote by
Π(S; I,O,R) := Π0(S)
S
A COMPOSITIONAL COALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS FOR STRATEGIC GAMES2 5
the set of all processes with states S, inputs I, outputs O, and results R.
2.2. Transformations of choice functors. In this section we present several
natural transformations between choice functors that will be needed in the next
section.
(1) For two choice functors C1 and C2, we define a natural transformation
µ1,2 : C1 ◦ C2 ⇒ C1,2
that combines a choice of C1 followed by a choice of C2 into a single choice
with respect to a combined functor C1,2.
(2) For a choice functor C and fixed sets A,B, we define a distributive law
δ : A+B × C(X)⇒ C(A+B ×X) .
(3) For two choice functors C1 and C2, we define a natural transformation
λ1,2 : C1(X)× C2(Y )⇒ C1,2(X × Y ) .
The definitions of all three natural transformations are the ones you would expect
from looking at the respective types. We encourage the reader to skip the formal
definitions below, which are only included for the sake of completeness.
(1.) For C2 = Cdet, we can use C1,2 := C1 and the identity function
µ1,det : C1(X)→ C1(X) .
Analogously, we can define µ1,2 for C1 = Cdet. For C1 = C2 = Cndet, we use
C1,2 := Cndet and the functions
µndet,ndet : Pfin(Pfin(X))→ Pfin(X) : U 7→
⋃
Z∈U Z
mapping a set U ⊆ Pfin(X) to its union. For C1 = C2 = Cprob, we use C1,2 := Cprob
and the functions
µprob,prob : Dfin(Dfin(X))→ Dfin(X)
mapping a distribution d over Dfin(X) to the distribution
x 7→
∑
d′∈D(X)
d(d′) · d′(x) .
The case where one of C1 and C2 equals Cndet and the other one equals Cprob is
more involved. We omit the definitions.
(2.) We define δ as follows. If C = Cdet, we can use the identity map
δdet : A+B ×X → A+B ×X .
If C = Cndet, we use the map
δndet : A+B × Pfin(X)→ Pfin(A+B ×X) ,
defined by
δndet(x) :=
{
{x} for x ∈ A ,
{ (b, u) | u ∈ U } for x = (b, U) ∈ B × Pfin(X) .
If C = Cprob, we use the map
δprob : A+B × Dfin(X)→ Dfin(A+B ×X) ,
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defined by
δprob(x) :=
{
dx for x ∈ A ,
db,e for x = (b, e) ∈ B × Dfin(X) ,
where
dx(y) :=
{
1 for y = x ,
0 otherwise .
and db,e(y) :=
{
e(c) for y = (b, c) ,
0 otherwise .
(3.) For C1 = Cdet, we can use for
λdet,det : X × C2(Y )⇒ C2(X × Y )
the distributive law δ from (2.) (setting A := ∅ and B := X). The case where
C2 = Cdet is handled symmetrically. For C1 = C2 = Cndet, we define
λndet,ndet : Pfin(X)× Pfin(Y )→ Pfin(X × Y ) : (U, V ) 7→ U × V .
For C1 = C2 = Cprob, we define
λprob,prob : Dfin(X)× Dfin(Y )→ Dfin(X × Y ) : (d, d′) 7→ ed,d′
where
ed,d′(x, y) := d(x) · d′(y) .
Again, we omit the cases mixing Cndet and Cprob.
2.3. Operations on processes. Before introducing games, let us present several
operations intended to construct processes from simpler ones. We start with sums
and products of processes.
(a) The sum of two processes is a process where, depending on the state, either
the first process takes a step, or the second one does. We only support the case
where both processes use the same choice functor. Formally, the sum + is the
operation
+ : Π(S0; I,O0, R0) + Π(S1; I,O1, R1)→ Π(S0 + S1; I,O0 +O1, R0 +R1)
defined by
(pi0 + pi1)(s) :=
{
pi0(s) if s ∈ S0 ,
pi1(s) if s ∈ S1 .
(b) The product pi1 × pi2 of two processes is a process where both components
take steps simultaneously. We support the case where pi1 and pi2 use different choice
functors. Suppose that pi1 uses C1, while pi2 uses C2. Formally, the product × is
the operation
× : Π(S0; I0, O0, R0) + Π(S1; I1, O1, R1)→
Π(S0 × S1; I0 × I1, O0 ×O1, R0 ×R1 +R0 +R1)
defined by
(pi0 × pi1)(s0, s1)(i0, i1) := (C1,2(f) ◦ λ1,2)(pi0(s0)(i0), pi1(s1)(i1)) ,
where λ is the natural transformation from Section 2.2 and
f : (R0 + S0 ×O0)× (R1 + S1 ×O1)→
(R0 ×R1 +R0 +R1 + S0 × S1 ×O0 ×O1)
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is the function
f(x0, x1) :=

(x0, x1) if x0 ∈ R0 and x1 ∈ R1 ,
x0 if x0 ∈ R0 and x1 /∈ R1 ,
x1 if x0 /∈ R0 and x1 ∈ R1 ,
(s0, s1, c0, c1) if x0 = (s0, c0) and x1 = (s1, c1) ,
(c) We also introduce two operations to modify the inputs and outputs. Given
a process pi and a function f , we define new processes pi . f and f . pi as follows.
For a function f : S ×O → S ×O′ and a process pi ∈ Π(S; I,O,R), the process
pi . f applies, after each step, the function f to the returned state-output pair.
Formally, we define pi . f ∈ Π(S; I,O′, R) by
(pi . f)(s)(i) := C(id + f)
(
pi(s)(i)
)
.
For a function f : I ′ → I and a process pi ∈ Π(S; I,O,R), the process f . pi
applies, before each step, the function f to the given input value. Formally, we
define f . pi ∈ Π(S; I ′, O,R) by
(f . pi)(s)(i) := pi(s)(f(i)) .
(d) Finally, we introduce two more complicated operations on processes. The
feedback operation takes a process pi and feeds back its output as an additional
input. That is, given a process pi ∈ Π(S; I × O,O,R) we construct a new process
pi	 ∈ Π(S × O; I,O,R) which, at each step, calls the process pi with its current
input value and the output of the previous turn. We define
pi	(s, c)(i) := C(idR + f)(pi(s)(i, c)) ,
where
f : S ×O → (S ×O)×O : (s, c) 7→ ((s, c), c) .
(e) The cascading operation takes two processes pi and %, runs them in parallel,
and uses the outputs of the first process as inputs of the second one. We support
the case where pi and % use different choice functors. Suppose that pi uses C1, while
% uses C2. Given pi ∈ Π(S; I,M,P ) and % ∈ Π(T ;M,O,R), we define pi . % ∈
Π(S × T ; I,O, P +R) as follows. Let
%′ : T ×M → C2(R+ T ×O) : (t,m) 7→ %(t)(m) ,
pi′ : S × T × I → C1(P + S × T ×M) : (s, t, i) 7→ C1(idP + ft)
(
pi(s)(i)
)
,
where
ft : S ×M → S × T ×M : (s,m) 7→ (s, t,m) .
We set
(pi . %)(s, t)(i) :=
(
C1,2(g) ◦ µ ◦ δ ◦ C1(idP + idS × %′)
)(
pi′(s, t, i)
)
,
where µ and δ are the natural transformations from Section 2.2 and
g : P + S × (R+ T ×O)→ P +R+ S × T ×O
is the function
g(x) :=

x if x ∈ P ,
r if x = (s, r) ∈ S ×R ,
(s, t, c) if x = (s, (t, c)) ∈ S × T ×O .
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2.4. Games. We consider games between several players that can consist of finitely
many or infinitely many rounds. The game starts in a certain state and, in each
round, every player chooses an action to perform. These actions determine the
state the game enters next. To determine the outcome of a game, we assume that
it produces an output value with each turn and that, at the end of the game, it
returns some result. Together, the produced sequence of output values and the final
result will determine the outcome. Formally, a game is therefore given by
• a set N of players,
• for each player p ∈ N , a set Ap of actions for player p,
• a set S of states of the game,
• a set R of results,
• a set O of output values, and
• a function
γ : S ×
∏
p∈N
Ap → C(R+ S ×O) .
Thus, a game is a process where the input has the special form
∏
p∈N Ap. In
particular, a game γ is a Γ-coalgebra
γ : S → Γ(S) ,
where Γ is the game functor
Γ(S) := C(R+ S ×O)
∏
p∈N Ap .
Example 2.5. To formalize the Prisoner’s Dilemma in our framework we use two
players N := {1, 2}, each with two actions Ap := {c, d} (‘confess’ and ‘deny’). The
game needs only one state S := {∗}, no outputs O := ∅, and results R := R × R.
The deterministic game function γ : S → RA1×A2 is defined by
γ(∗)(a1, a2) :=

(1, 1) if (a1, a2) = (c, c) ,
(2,−1) if (a1, a2) = (d, c) ,
(−1, 2) if (a1, a2) = (c, d) ,
(0, 0) if (a1, a2) = (d, d) .
Example 2.6. Let us also formalize the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Again, there
are two players N := {1, 2} with two actions Ap := {c, d} each. We still have only
one state S := {∗}, but now use outputs O := R × R and no results R := ∅. The
deterministic game function γ : S → (S ×O)A1×A2 is defined by
γ(∗)(a1, a2) :=

(∗, (1, 1)) if (a1, a2) = (c, c) ,
(∗, (2,−1)) if (a1, a2) = (d, c) ,
(∗, (−1, 2)) if (a1, a2) = (c, d) ,
(∗, (0, 0)) if (a1, a2) = (d, d) .
Example 2.7. For a more involved example, we consider a social game using endoge-
nous networks. Given a group N of players, we model their social interactions as a
graph 〈N,E〉 where the edge relation E connects two players if they are friends. In
each turn of the game, new friendships may form and old ones may end. Thus, the
graph changes in the course of the game. We can model this game in our framework
by using as set of states S the set of all possible edge relations E. Each player p has
two possible actions: he can befriend another player q, or he can end an existing
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friendship with some player. The game function γ : S → Γ(S) takes the current
network E as an input and modifies it according to the actions of all players.
2.5. Players and strategies. Let γ : S → Γ(S) be a game. A strategy for a player
p ∈ N is a function telling him which action to choose in a given turn of the game.
The player has access to his current observations and his knowledge of the play so
far. Thus, formally a strategy is a function
σ : Ep ×Bp → C(Ep ×Ap) ,
where Ep is the epistemic state of player p and Bp is the set of possible observations.
Again, we write σ as a coalgebra
σ : Ep → C(Ep ×Ap)Bp ,
that is, a process with inputs Bp, outputs Ap, and results R = ∅.
The observations of a player depend on the current input, the output of the
previous turn, and the actions of all players during the previous turn. To specify
what exactly player p can observe, we use a function
βp : O ×
∏
p∈N
Ap → Bp ,
which we assume to be a part of the description of the game.
Example 2.8. Suppose we are playing the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. A prob-
abilistic strategy for player 1 would be to copy the previous action of the other
player with probability 2/3, and to choose the other action with probability 1/3.
We use only one state E1 := {∗} and the observations B1 := {c, d} are the previous
actions of player 2.
σ1 : {∗} → Dfin({∗} × {c, d}){c,d} : ∗ 7→ d
where
d(x)(∗, y) :=
{
2/3 if x = y ,
1/3 if x 6= y .
If, in a game γ, we fix strategies (σp)p∈N0 for a subset N0 ⊆ N of the players,
we obtain a new game with players N \ N0. We denote this game by γ[σp]p∈N0 .
The formal definition is as follows. For players p ∈ N \ N0 where no strategy is
provided, we introduce a non-deterministic dummy strategy that, independently of
the input, always tells the player to play some action from Ap without restricting
his choice. This strategy uses only one state. Its formal definition is
σp : 1→ Pfin(1×Ap)Bp : i 7→ Ap .
With the help of these dummy strategies, we can define the desired game as
γ[σp]p∈N0 :=
[[
f .
∏
p∈N
σp
]	
. γ
]	
∈ Π(S ×∏p∈N Ep ×O ×∏p∈N Ap, ∅, O,R) ,
where the function
f : O ×
∏
p∈N
Ap →
∏
p∈N
Bp : (c, a¯) 7→ (βp(c, a¯))p∈N ,
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computes the observations of each player. The states of this new game are tuples
(s, e¯, c, a¯) ∈ S ×
∏
p∈N
Ep ×O ×
∏
p∈N
Ap
consisting of a state s of the old game, the epistemic states e¯ of the players, the
output c of the last turn, and the actions a¯ the players chose last turn.
2.6. Game trees. Given a game γ and strategies σp for each player, we would
like to compute the result of the game if each player follows her strategy. Besides
the techniques from the previous section, we need one more definition: that of a
game tree. Informally, a game tree is a tree containing all possible sequences of
events allowed in the game. The formal definition is based on the notion of a final
coalgebra.
Definition 2.9. Let F be a functor. An F-coalgebra ω : Ω → F(Ω) is final if, for
every F-coalgebra h : X → F(X), there exists a unique morphism ϕ : X → Ω such
that the diagram
X Ω
F(X) F(Ω)
h
ϕ
F(ϕ)
ω
commutes.
For the process functors
Π0(X) = C(R+X ×O)I
there exist final Π0-coalgebras ω : Ω→ Π0(Ω), provided that the choice functor C is
sufficiently well-behaved. In particular, this is the case for the three choice functors
Cdet, Cndet, and Cprob.
Let us describe the final Π0-coalgebras for the choice functors C introduced
above. The elements of these final coalgebras are trees, which are directed acyclic
graphs such that there exists one vertex, the root of the tree, with the property
that every other vertex can be reached by a unique path from the root. A tree is
(A,B,C)-labelled if it has more than one vertex and
• the root is unlabelled,
• every other inner vertex is labelled by an element of B,
• every leaf is labelled by an element of A ∪B,
• every edge is labelled by an element of C.
If there is an edge with label c from a vertex x to a vertex y, we call y the c-successor
of x.
(a) We start with the functor
Π0(X) := (A+X ×B)C
for C = Cdet. In this case the final Π0-coalgebra ω : Ω→ Π0(Ω) takes the following
form. The set Ω consists of all (A,B,C)-labelled trees that are deterministic, that
is, such that every leaf has a label in A and every inner vertex has exactly one
c-successor, for each c ∈ C. The function ω is defined as follows: given a tree T and
a value c ∈ C, we distinguish two cases depending on the label of the c-successor x
of the root. If x is labelled by an element a ∈ A, we set ω(T )(c) := a. If x is
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labelled by an element b ∈ B, we set ω(T )(c) := 〈T ′, b〉 where T ′ is the subtree of T
rooted at x.
To see that this is indeed the final Π0-coalgebra, consider an arbitrary Π0-
coalgebra pi : S → Π0(S). The required unique function ϕ : S → Ω is given
by
ϕ(s) := Ts , for s ∈ S ,
where the tree Ts is defined as follows: we first construct a graph 〈V,E〉 with set of
vertices V := A+ S ×B and the following edges. For every 〈s, b〉 ∈ S ×B, there is
a c-labelled edge from 〈s, b〉 to pi(s)(c). The elements of A have no outgoing edges.
The vertex labelling is the natural one: a vertex a ∈ A gets the label a and a vertex
〈s, b〉 gets the label b ∈ B.
The tree Ts is now obtained from the unravelling of this graph starting at a vertex
〈s, b〉, for an arbitrary b ∈ B, by forgetting the label b of the root. Formally, the
unravelling of a graph 〈V,E〉 starting at a vertex s is defined as the tree consisting
of all finite paths through the graph that start at s. There is an edge between two
such paths if the second one is obtained from the first one by appending a single
edge. This edge also determines the label of the edge label. The vertex labelling of
the tree is obtained by labelling each path with the label of its end-vertex.
Example 2.10. Let pi ∈ Π({sa, sb}; {0, 1}, {a, b}, ∅) be the deterministic process
defined by
pi(sx)(y) :=
{
(sa, x) if y = 0 ,
(sb, x) if y = 1 .
The (top of the) tree ϕ(sa) has the following form:
•
a a
a a b b
0 1
0 1 0 1
...
...
...
...
To see that the function ϕ defined in this way has the required property we need
to check that
Π0(ϕ) ◦ pi = ω ◦ ϕ .
For s ∈ S and c ∈ C, suppose that
pi(s)(c) = 〈s′, b〉 ∈ S ×B .
Let T := ϕ(s) and T ′ := ϕ(s′). Note that T ′ is equal to the subtree of T rooted at
the c-successor of the root and that this c-successor is labelled by b. Hence,
(Π0(ϕ) ◦ pi)(s)(c) = Π0(ϕ)(〈s′, b〉) = 〈T ′, b〉 = ω(T )(c) = (ω ◦ ϕ)(s)(c) .
In the case where pi(s)(c) = a ∈ A we argue similarly.
(b) Consider the functor
Π0(X) := Pfin(A+X ×B)C
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for non-deterministic games. In this case the final Π0-coalgebra ω : Ω → Π0(Ω)
takes the following form. The set Ω consists of all (A,B,C)-labelled trees where
each vertex has only finitely many c-successors, for every c ∈ C. The function ω
is defined as follows. Given a tree T and a value c ∈ C, let S be the set of all
c-successors of the root of T . Then ω(T )(c) returns the set
{ a ∈ A | some x ∈ S has label a } ∪ { 〈Tx, b〉 | x ∈ S has label b ∈ B } ,
where Tx is the subtree of T rooted at x.
Given an arbitrary Π0-coalgebra pi : S → Π0(S), the required unique function
ϕ : S → Ω is defined similarly as in (a). We set
ϕ(s) := Ts , for s ∈ S ,
where Ts is the unravelling of the following graph 〈V,E〉. Again the set of vertices is
V := A+S×B and the vertex labelling is the natural one. For each 〈s, b〉 ∈ S×B,
there is a c-labelled edge from 〈s, b〉 to x, for every x ∈ pi(s)(c).
As above, a straightforward calculation shows that the function ϕ defined in this
way has the required properties.
Example 2.11. Let pi ∈ Π({∗}; {0, 1}, {a, b}, ∅) be the non-deterministic process
defined by
pi(∗)(x) := {(∗, a), (∗, b)} .
The tree ϕ(∗) has the following form:
•
a b a b
a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b
0
0 1
1
0
0 1
1 0
0 1
1 0
0 1
1 0
0 1
1
(c) Finally, consider the functor
Π0(X) := Dfin(A+X ×B)C
for probabilistic games. In this case the final Π0-coalgebra ω : Ω → Π0(Ω) takes
the following form: the set Ω consists of all (A,B,C × [0, 1])-labelled trees where,
for every c ∈ C and every vertex v,
• v has only finitely many outgoing edges labelled 〈c, p〉, for some p ∈ [0, 1],
• the sum of all values p such that there is an outgoing edge with label 〈c, p〉
equals 1, and
• v does not have two outgoing edges with labels 〈c, p〉 and 〈c, p′〉 where p, p′ ∈
[0, 1] and such that the subtrees rooted at the corresponding successors are
isomorphic.
The function ω is defined as follows: given a tree T , a value c ∈ C, a ∈ A, and
〈T ′, b〉 ∈ Ω×B, we set
ω(T )(c)(a) := p
if the root of T has an outgoing edge with label 〈c, p〉 that leads to a leaf with
label a, and we set
ω(T )(c)(〈T ′, b〉) := p
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if the root of T has an outgoing edge with label 〈c, p〉 that leads to an inner vertex x
with label b such that the subtree of T rooted at x is equal to T ′. In all other cases,
we set
ω(T )(c)(x) := 0 .
Given an arbitrary Π0-coalgebra pi : S → Π0(S), the required unique function
ϕ : S → Ω is defined similarly as in (a). We set
ϕ(s) := Ts , for s ∈ S ,
where Ts is the unravelling of the following graph 〈V,E〉: again the set of vertices is
V := A+S×B and the vertex labelling is the natural one. For each 〈s, b〉 ∈ S×B
and every x ∈ A+ S ×B, there is a 〈c, pi(s)(c)(x)〉-labelled edge from 〈s, b〉 to x.
As above, a straightforward calculation shows that the function ϕ defined in this
way has the required properties.
Example 2.12. Let pi ∈ Π({∗}; {0, 1}, {a, b}, ∅) be the probabilistic process defined
by
pi(∗)(x)(s, c) := 1/2 .
The tree ϕ(∗) has the following form:
•
a b a b
a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b
0, 1
2
0, 1
2
1, 1
2
1, 1
2
0, 1
2
1, 1
2
0, 1
2
1, 1
2
0, 1
2
1, 1
2
0, 1
2
1, 1
2
(Due to space considerations we have omitted some edge labels.)
We have seen that the final coalgebras consist of trees describing all possible
sequences in the game. Given a game γ : S → Γ(S) and the unique morphism
ϕ : S → Ω into the final Γ-coalgebra, we call the tree ϕ(s) the game tree of γ when
starting in state s ∈ S.
2.7. The outcome of a game. After these preparations we can determine the
outcome of a game. Given a game γ and strategies σp for each player, we can
compute a game γ[σp]p without players and determine its game tree T . Hence, it
remains to define how to read off the outcome from a game tree.
Let γ : S → Γ(S) be a game without players and let ω : Ω → Γ(Ω) be the
final Γ-coalgebra. To define the outcome γ we specify a set U of outcomes and two
functions % : Ω→ U and τ : Γ(U)→ U such that
Ω
U
Γ(Ω)
Γ(U)
%
ω
τ
Γ(%)
Intuitively, % maps a game tree to its outcome, while τ computes the outcome of a
game from the outcomes of its subgames. Hence, τ performs a local computation,
while % is needed to compute the limit of an infinite sequence of turns. Ideally,
the function τ uniquely determines %. This is the case, for instance, for discounted
pay-off games, where the value of a game mostly depends on an initial segment of
the game tree.
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Example 2.13. Consider a deterministic two player game with R = R×R and O =
R × R. Fixing deterministic strategies for both players, we obtain a deterministic
zero-player game, the game tree of which is either an infinite sequence over O or a
finite sequence where the last element is from R and the remaining ones are from O.
Choosing a discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1), we can define the outcome by the functions
τ : R+ U ×O → U and % : Ω→ U ,
where U := R× R and
τ(x, y) := (x, y) , for (x, y) ∈ R ,
τ((x, y), (u, v)) := (λx+ u, λy + v) , for ((x, y), (u, v)) ∈ U ×O .
The function % is uniquely determined by τ . An explicit definition is
%(xn, yn)n<α :=
(∑
n<α λ
nxn,
∑
n<α λ
nyn
)
.
2.8. Nash equilibria. Having defined the outcome of a game, we can introduce
equilibria. Consider a game γ with set of players N and set of outcomes U := RN .
We fix an output value cˆ ∈ O and actions aˆ ∈ ∏pAp that will serve as imaginary
outcome of the ‘first game turn’. Let τ : Γ(U)→ U and % : Ω→ U be the functions
to compute the outcome of γ. For a tuple σ¯ = (σp)p∈N of strategies, we denote by
ϕ[σ¯] : S → Ω the function from the reduced game γ[σ¯] to the final coalgebra.
Given strategies σp, for each p ∈ N , initial states s0 ∈ S and ep ∈ Ep, for p ∈ N ,
and a player q ∈ N , we say that 〈σq, eq〉 is a best response to 〈σp, ep〉p∈N\{q} in the
game 〈γ, s0〉 if
%(ϕ[σ¯](s0, e¯, cˆ, aˆ)) ≥ %(ϕ[σ¯′](s0, e¯′, cˆ, aˆ)) ,
for all tuples σ¯′ and e¯′ that differ from, respectively, σ¯ and e¯ only in the p-th
component.
We say that 〈σ¯, e¯〉 is a Nash equilibrium of 〈γ, s0〉 if, for every player q ∈ N ,
〈σq, eq〉 is a best response to 〈σp, ep〉p∈N\{q} in 〈γ, s0〉.
There exist especially well-behaved Nash equilibria called subgame perfect equi-
libria. In order to define them, we need the notion of an n-modification of a strategy
σ : E → C(E × A)B . Intuitively, an n-modification of σ is a new strategy that co-
incides with σ, except for the first n turns of the game. Formally, we define it as a
strategy
σ′ : E + [n]→ C((E + [n])×A)B
(where [n] := {0, . . . , n− 1}) that satisfies the following conditions:
σ′(e) = σ(e) , for e ∈ E ,
σ′(k) ∈ C({k + 1} ×A)B for k ∈ [n], k < n− 1 ,
σ′(k) ∈ C(E ×A)B for k = n− 1 .
We say that a Nash equilibrium 〈σ¯, e¯〉 is subgame perfect if, for every n ∈ N,
all n-modifications σ¯′ of σ¯, and every player q ∈ N , 〈σ′q, 0〉 is a best response to
〈σ′p, 0〉p∈N\{q} in 〈γ, s0〉, where we restrict the notion of a best response only to
consider strategies coinciding with the given one in the first n turns.
Example 2.14. Consider the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma introduced in Exam-
ple 2.6. To define the outcome of the game we use a discounted sum with discount
factor λ < 1.
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We take a look at two strategies: (i) a simple strategy σ that always denies and
(ii) a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy σ′ which mirrors the last move of the opponent. We
can define these two strategies as follows. Both strategies use no epistemic states
Ep := {∗} and as observations Bp := {c, d} the last action of the opponent.
σ(∗)(x) := d and σ′(∗)(x) := x .
The pair 〈σ, σ〉 of simple strategies is a Nash equilibrium with outcome 〈0, 0〉,
since every change of one strategy results in a negative outcome for that player.
The equilibrium is subgame perfect, as both the strategies and the game do not
depend on the history of the play.
The pair 〈σ′, σ′〉 of ‘tit-for-tat’ strategies is also a Nash equilibrium. Its outcome
is 〈2/(1−λ), 2/(1−λ)〉. This time the equilibrium is not subgame perfect. Consider
the 1-modification 〈σ′c, σ′d〉 of 〈σ′, σ′〉 where in the first turn, player 1 plays c while
player 2 plays d. This leads to the play (c, d)(d, c)(c, d)(d, c) . . . with outcome 2−λ1−λ2
(for the first player). If, instead of σ′d, the second player chooses the strategy of
always playing d, we obtain the play (c, d)(d, d)(d, d)(d, d) . . . with outcome 2. Since
0 < λ < 1, this is larger than 2−λ1−λ2 .
2.9. Summary. Summing up the preceding sections, we have seen that we can
specify a game by the following data:
• a set N of players,
• for each p ∈ N , a set Ap of actions for player p,
• for each p ∈ N , a set Bp of observations for player p,
• a set S of states of the game,
• a set R of results,
• a set O of output values,
• a set U of outcomes,
• a function
γ : S → C(R+ S ×O)
∏
p∈N Ap
computing a single step of the game,
• for each p ∈ N , a function
βp : O ×
∏
p∈N
Ap → Bp
computing the observations of player p, and
• two functions % : Ω→ U and τ : Γ(U)→ U that satisfy
% = τ ◦ Γ(%) ◦ ω
and thus compute the outcome of a play.
3. Examples
In this section we present the formulations of two basic games in our framework.
The first game is one with imperfect information as imperfect monitoring. The
second game is the one with incomplete information [23].
The usual approach in game theory is to reduce incomplete information to im-
perfect one. Incomplete information denotes situations where the type of agents is
not known while imperfect information denotes situations where the state of the
game is not known. In our framework this differentiation is not important since
both kinds of information deficiencies are captured by unobservable state spaces.
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3.1. Imperfect Public Monitoring. The imperfect information game with im-
perfect monitoring and a noisy signal considers games where the agents’ actions
may not be directly observable. The state of the game is driven by a probabilistic
state transition and may be either “good” or “bad”. This information is publicly
observed by the agents, i.e. all players observe the same signal. The payoff is a
function of this public outcome.
Again we have two players with two actions each: N = {1, 2} and Ap = {c, d}.
There are no results R = ∅ since the game never ends. The output values are
O = R× R× Y with Y := {G,B} that encode the payoffs in the stage games and
the public signal. The game has a single state S = {∗}.
The game for the probabilistic functor Cγ = Cprob, is the function
γ : S → Cprob(S ×O)A1×A2
(∗, a1, a2) 7→ (∗, (r1, r2, y))
where
rp =

1 + 2−2kk−m if (ap, y) = (c,G)
1− 2kk−m if (ap, y) = (c,B)
2−2n
m−n if (ap, y) = (d,G)
−2n
m−n if (ap, y) = (d,B)
y =

G with probability k if (a1, a2) = (c, c)
G with probability m if (a1, a2) = (c, d) ∨ (a1, a2) = (d, c)
G with probability n if (a1, a2) = (d, d)
B with probability 1− k if (a1, a2) = (c, c)
B with probability 1−m if (a1, a2) = (c, d) ∨ (a1, a2) = (d, c)
B with probability 1− n if (a1, a2) = (d, d)
The probabilities of the state transition are characterized by the parameters k >
m > n. The parameters are chosen so that the expected value of the payoffs is
given by the prisoner’s dilemma matrix:
c d
c (1, 1) (−1, 2)
d (2,−1) (0, 0)
The game has imperfect information so that the epistemic state of the players
is not the state of the game. Each player knows the history of his actions and the
history of the public signals
Ep = (Ap × Y )∗.
The observation function is
βp : O ×A1 ×A2 → Bp
((r1, r2, y), a1, a2) 7→ (rp, y, ap).
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We consider deterministic strategies with choice functor Cσ = Cdet. An example
of always (unconditionally) playing d for a player p is given by
σ1 : E1 → (E1 ×A1)B1
(h, (r1, y, a1)) 7→ (h(a1, y), d)
where h(ap, y) denotes that the history h of the epistemic state is extended by the
action ap and the public signal y.
3.2. Incomplete Information. In a Bayesian game of incomplete information
types of agents are not common knowledge. In the simplest case we take types of
agents to be represented as different payoff functions of the game and each agent
knows his own type but not the one of his opponent.
In the following example we define that the game is played only once. However,
our framework is rich enough to easily extend the game to be played finitely, infin-
itely or potentially infinitely often. The types of agents can be drawn repeatedly
or as in the following example only once. The agents can use Bayesian updating or
in fact any kind of a learning rule.
We define a Bayesian game of four 2× 2 games: Matching Pennies (MP), Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD), Coordination Game (CG) and Battle of the Sexes (BS) with
equivalence classes Ii,j for players i and types j. Player 1, if of type 1, knows
that the payoff is either MP or PD and if of type 2, that the payoff is either
CG or BS. Player 2, if of type 1, knows that the payoff is either MP or CG and
if of type 2, that the payoff is either PD or BS. The probabilities are given by
pMP = 0.3, pPD = 0.1, pCG = 0.2 and pBS = 0.4.
MP
2,0 0,2
0,2 2,0
p = 0.3
PD
2,2 0,3
3,0 1,1
p = 0.1
CG
2,0 0,0
0,0 1,1
p = 0.2
BS
2,1 0,0
0,0 1,2
p = 0.4
I1,1
I1,2
I2,1 I2,2
The state space of the game is S = {∗,MP, PD,CG,BS}. The output space
of the game is O = S and the result space is R = R × R. The action spaces are
A1 = {U,D} and A2 = {L,R} and the epistemic state spaces have a single state
E1 = E2 = {∗}. We formalize this game in two rounds.
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(1) In the first round the game is in state ∗ and nature realizes the types of the
players, the actions of the players are irrelevant.
γ : S → Cprob(R+ S ×O)A1×A2
(∗, a1, a2) 7→

(MP,MP ) with pMP = 0.3
(PD,PD) with pPD = 0.1
(CG,CG) with pCG = 0.2
(BS,BS) with pBS = 0.4
In the second round the game yields a result.
(MP, a1, a2) 7→

(2, 0) if a1 = U, a2 = L
(0, 2) if a1 = U, a2 = R
(0, 2) if a1 = D, a2 = L
(2, 0) if a1 = D, a2 = R
An analogous definition has to be given for the other type realizations
PD,CG,BS.
(2) The observation function of the first player is
β1 : O ×A1 ×A2 → B1
(o, a1, a2) 7→

∗ if o = ∗
{MP,PD} if o = MP ∨ o = PD
{CG,BS} if o = CG ∨ o = BS
The observation function of player 2 is defined analogously.
(3) The strategies for both players are given by
σp : {∗} → C({∗} ×Ap)Bp
For example, the strategy of player 1 who plays U if he is of type 1 and D
if he is of type 2 is given by
(∗, b1) 7→
{
U if b1 = {MP,PD}
D if b1 = {CG,BS}
In the first round when nature chooses the types, the strategy of the players
is irrelevant since it does not matter in the game function.
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